Trapped: Smallholder Coffee Producers in the Papua New Guinea Highlands by MacWilliam, Scott
Discussion Paper 2020/1Scott MacWilliam
 dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au
independence in 1975, entrapment has intensified for 
a substantial proportion of the country’s people. About 
400,000 smallholder households, or about 80 per cent, 
of Highlands’ households produce about 85 per cent of 
the national output and depend upon coffee for all or 
part of their cash income (CIC 2017; Curry, Koczberski 
and Inu 2019). These smallholders probably constitute 
around one-quarter of the country’s total population 
of over eight million.3 (‘Probably’ is employed, as PNG 
population figures are not always reliable.)
With little, if any, real increase in prices for a crop 
that forms the most important component of household 
incomes — and with only minimal provision of state 
efforts to raise productivity and quality — households 
continue to be told that they are primarily responsible 
for securing any improvements in conditions. As arabica 
producers in PNG become more dependent on their 
export crop, major changes in international production 
and consumption are against them. 
The crop, which had been encouraged by the late 
colonial administration as a means of securing village 
life, prior to the ascendancy of a process which was 
anticipated to produce urbanisation, industrialisation 
and landless proletarianisation (MacWilliam 2013, 
2018, 2019), has become instead the most important 
instrument of entrapment. The promise of ‘the money 
that grows on trees’ (Brookfield 1968) led to the 
continuity of relatively undifferentiated family labour 
processes, with little division of labour and thus only 
minor productivity increases, producing a crop subject 
to the vagaries of international markets. 
Papua New Guinea producers as ‘price-takers’ 
As very little coffee produced in PNG is consumed 
in the country, it is international conditions that are 
Introduction
Soon after becoming Papua New Guinea’s latest Prime 
Minister, James Marape fittingly drew particular 
attention to the condition of the majority of the 
country’s population who live in rural areas. He said: 
Eighty per cent of this country [is] still locked in 
the enclaves of rural entrapment. Those of us in 
cities are enjoying and yet they are stuck up there. 
They deserve to be lifted. (Whiting and Graue 
30/5/2019)
His depiction of life for the smaller proportion of 
the country’s population that lives in urban areas as 
being ‘enjoyable’ ignores the impoverished conditions 
faced by many city and town residents. Further, the 
reference to ‘lifted’ suggests a recognition of the need 
to raise living standards as an objective of government 
action but without any suggestion on how this might 
occur when previous governments have had other 
priorities. Nor was there an explanation for the ‘rural 
entrapment’ or a statement of how any state policy 
that pushed substantial numbers into towns and cities 
to remove the ‘rural’ component might lead to urban 
impoverishment instead.1
This Discussion Paper cannot examine how most 
of the rural population of PNG has become locked 
in impoverished conditions, even as the United 
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human 
Development Index rates the country as one of 
low human development, 155th out of 176 (UNDP 
2018:310). Nor can it consider in detail differences 
in degrees of poverty across rural areas (Allen 2009). 
Instead, this paper uses a particular region of the 
country, the central Highlands,2 and coffee-growing 
households in that region, to illustrate how since 
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shade management, application and non-application 
of chemical fertilisers, quantity and timing of rainfall 
as well as strength of winds, and sunshine: each and 
all affect the health of trees and thus yields, with 
climate change recognised as a major determinant. 
The global production of coffee is also subject to local 
political upheavals, including civil wars. As a result, 
output can vary considerably in the short to medium 
term. However, for the condition of smallholders in 
PNG and elsewhere, it is the long-term trends that 
are most important and will be emphasised here. The 
persistence of surplus production over consumption, 
the importance of the rise of new sources, especially 
Vietnam and Indonesia, and the increased output of 
lower quality and priced coffee, particularly robusta, are 
the most important of these trends (see below).
The importance of coffee exports for national 
revenues and company profits has resulted in 
a continuous threat of production exceeding 
consumption on world markets (Economist Intelligence 
Unit 1987). Further:
Since 1964, world coffee production has grown 
at a rate of 1.4% per year, increasing from 3.1 to 
6.3 million tonnes. With a lower growth rate than 
Robusta (0.9% as compared to 2.7%), Arabica’s 
share has fallen from 4/5 to 2/3 of total coffee 
production over the last 40 years … Arabica is 
far more sensitive to climatic conditions and 
therefore subject to greater fluctuations in its 
production from year to year. (OECD 2007)
By 2019, while the year-on-year variability in 
production continued, in part due to the biennial 
bearing pattern prevalent for arabica trees, robusta’s 
ascendancy became even more apparent (USDA 
2019). Occasionally, major weather shocks and civil 
wars have broken the long-term trend of production 
exceeding consumption. These exceptional events, as 
well as climate change, have often led to new plantings 
and subsequent production increases, with supply 
once again exceeding demand as governments urge 
continuous increases in production. Because green 
bean can under optimal conditions be stored for 
periods without losing quality, the relationship between 
production and consumption has also been affected 
by the capacity of various state agencies to withhold 
stocks. In periods of low prices, warehouses are filled 
until coffee is subsequently released on to markets 
at propitious times when prices rise: the annual 
an important determinant of livelihoods for coffee-
producing households in the country. Despite a 
consistent drive to increase output in PNG, this 
has occurred at a slower rate than has occurred 
internationally. At independence in 1975, PNG 
produced about 650,000 (60 kg) bags, or under 
one per cent of global output of 80 million bags. 
Subsequently, world coffee production for 2018–19 
was estimated to be about 175 million (60 kg) bags, 
with PNG’s maximum reaching just over one million 
bags in the late 1990s and again on several occasions 
in the next decades (CIC 22/3/2017). That is, world 
production has more than doubled, while PNG’s output 
has increased by approximately one and a half times 
(Sengere 2016:92; USDA 2019; OECD 2007).4 
Even as PNG’s output has increased since 
independence, almost all of the country’s exports are 
still in the form of green bean: only small amounts are 
either sold overseas or consumed domestically as roast 
and ground coffee. The effect is that prices received 
by smallholders, with relatively slight variations due 
to the abilities of trading companies and processors to 
grasp shares of these prices, are largely determined by 
international trends for particular varieties of this form 
of coffee. (There are continuing disputes, not examined 
here, about the extent to which traders and processors 
‘distort’ these trends and undercut the prices paid to 
growers. See Batt and Murray-Prior 2007). 
In terms of coffee exports, PNG continues to be 
what is termed a ‘price-taker’. Further, most of PNG’s 
coffee goes to those sections of the market where 
downward pressure on prices has been most substantial 
over the last 40 years, as explained below. With only 
occasional peaks, international prices for PNG’s main 
coffee exports have remained stagnant in nominal 
terms since independence (Sengere 2016:92, Figure 
4.3). Regardless of this price trend, as the smallholding 
proportion of total output has increased, from around 
70 per cent at independence to about 85 per cent 
currently, there has been a continuous call to increase 
production and improve quality (see below).
Part 1: Global coffee: Persistent surpluses, 
changing sources and the rise of robusta
Surpluses
The production and marketing of coffee is affected 
by important local, national and international 
determinations. Soil fertility, attention to pruning, 
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oriented market economy, the program sought to deal 
with the disorder created by prolonged warfare through 
expanding domestic agricultural and manufacturing 
production. Rice and coffee became two of the most 
important export crops. Some of the expansion of 
coffee-growing involved moving populations into 
highland areas, suitable for growing arabica, but a more 
substantial increase occurred by stimulating the output 
of robusta in lower altitude regions. As the World Bank 
(2004) noted of Vietnam:
For decades the state has been an integral part of 
the coffee sector’s development … Government 
and parastatal organizations increasingly embrace 
free market structures but still have a presence in 
the sector. Government is the primary and most 
influential institution and has created nearly the 
entire sector’s other institutions. (emphasis added) 
So successful has the program been for coffee, that:
Between 1980 and 2000, Vietnam went from 
producing 8,400 tons of coffee to producing 
900,000 tons,5 averaging more than 26 percent 
growth per year. Half a million small-scale coffee 
farmers now grow beans by cultivating two to 
three acres of land (Zhang 2016).
By 2019–20, Vietnam was forecast to produce more 
than 32 million 60 kg bags, or 1.9 million tonnes, 
about one-fifth of global production. Of this total, the 
bulk exported was robusta. Less than 10 per cent of 
Vietnam’s output is of arabica, as the total production 
and robusta’s share continues to climb (USDA 2019). 
Importance of government’s reforming role for 
Brazilian production and consumption
With the collapse of the international efforts of 
producing countries to raise producer prices (see 
below), national governments and other state agencies, 
including in PNG, have been forced into country-
specific measures. With some capacity to withhold 
stocks from export to reduce supply in order to raise 
prices, government agencies in the world’s major coffee 
producing nation, Brazil, have also taken important 
reform steps. 
One of these has been to encourage greater 
production of robusta from lower altitude regions of 
the country less susceptible to frost. As a result, when 
arabica production declines in a low-yielding year, 
robusta growers are able to gain a greater share of 
relationship between total production and consumption 
is continuously mediated by the level of global stocks 
(USDA 2019).
Total global production has also been affected by 
the emergence of major new producing countries, 
where robusta is the principal form of coffee grown. 
Robusta production has become more important in 
countries, including Brazil, where arabica’s previous 
predominance is now under challenge (see USDA 
2019, and below). Over the last 30 years, Vietnam and 
Indonesia have risen into second and fourth places 
in total output (Zhang 2016; Indonesia Investments 
2019). Both countries have become more important 
for robusta production and play an important part in 
that crop moving toward parity with arabica output 
(OECD 2007). Since 1988, with funding and other 
assistance from the UNDP and the World Bank, China 
too has embarked upon a major expansion of coffee 
growing, although with arabica the principal variety 
planted in Yunnan Province with an average altitude of 
2000 metres (Heinze 28/9/2016). Robusta is a higher 
yielding, more disease resistant species of coffee tree 
capable of being grown at lower altitudes than arabica. 
These changes in sources of supply have been 
driven by government policies and programs, 
even where the sheen of private efforts, including 
privatisation, following so-called free market principles, 
gloss over the importance of state coordination and 
supervision. Vietnam provides an exemplary instance 
of governmental and other state agency roles in 
increasing production.
Importance of national government roles for 
newer producers
Against retraction from coffee growing in some 
countries, in others including China (see above), the 
most substantial increases in production have occurred 
where governments have emphasised the importance 
of coffee for national economic growth and to combat 
the possibility of disorder arising from unemployment 
and impoverishment. For instance, during the colonial 
period and prior to independence in 1945, estates/
plantations mainly grew arabica in Vietnam. After the 
1975 completion of military victory over the US-led 
invasion forces, the government of Vietnam developed 
a program of reconstruction (Zhang 2016). Labelled 
Doi Moi (Hays 2014) and launched in 1986 to produce 
an economic rejuvenation or officially a socialist-
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national production (USDA 2019). Instead of unwashed 
arabicas having near-complete dominance, robusta 
now comprises almost one-third of Brazil’s total output. 
When Brazil is already a major producer of unwashed 
arabicas6 that obtain lower prices on international 
markets, the growth in robusta output acts as a further 
downward pressure on global coffee markets. In 
Brazil, government agencies are pouring resources 
into research on higher-yielding coffee varieties, 
mechanised harvesting, improved farming practices, and 
encouraging diversification into other crops, including 
soy bean. These reforms, especially the increase in 
robusta production, have also been instrumental for 
Brazil’s rise as a consumer country, which has been 
so substantial that it now challenges the long-term 
consumption leader, the United States (US).
Consumption
Coffee production and consumption has, since the 19th 
century, been divided to a substantial extent between 
countries where the crop is produced and those where 
most is consumed. The United States and Western 
Europe have been the main consuming locations, 
with Brazil and Ethiopia the only two countries where 
production as well as consumption are important. 
Consumption in Europe now exceeds that in the US 
(Caffeine Informer n.d.).
While some of the following trends in coffee’s 
consumption commenced before 1975 (Pendergast 
1999), over the last 40 years they have intensified. 
Although by the late 1960s overall growth had already 
slowed in the main consumer markets, over the last 
three decades there has been a greater rate of increase in 
other markets (OECD 2007). Competition from other 
beverages, including aerated waters, has also increased 
(Pendergast 1999). The national changes reflect how 
the main shifts in consumption, towards cheaper coffee 
from lower-grade arabica beans and robusta on the one 
hand, and higher-priced specialty, mainly arabica, beans, 
on the other, are determinant on international markets. 
(There are, of course, exceptions to such general 
statements: the highest-priced coffee is a specialty 
robusta from Indonesia, coffee luwak — Indonesia 
Investments 2017). 
The coffee market throughout the world has 
increasingly split into two main components: cheaper 
instant and other blended ground coffee; and the 
extensive range of specialty roast and other coffees. The 
latter include national brands, Free Trade and organic 
varieties (Pendergast 1999). Greater consumption in 
countries outside the United States, especially western 
and central Europe and into Russia and China, has 
occurred, mainly through the increased availability of 
instant and other soluble coffees (Ferdman 14/7/2014; 
Inu 2015:31). These consumption increases at 
particular moments led some observers to suggest a 
forthcoming world shortage of supply (OECD 2007:6). 
This prediction tends to ignore the history of coffee 
production and consumption in which shortages are 
soon followed by surpluses as a result of government 
and other state agency action taken in producing 
countries (see above). Instead, producers in different 
countries are forced to deal with these two main 
international production directions in distinct ways.
Each direction, with distinct price effects towards 
greater consumption of speciality coffees and increased 
demand for bulk coffees, places pressure on households 
(as the most important producers) to work longer 
hours, search for additional sources of income and vary 
labour time devoted to coffee. The shift away from 
international and domestic efforts to maintain prices, 
which accelerated from the late 1980s, has further 
exaggerated the uncertainties of household existence.
Increased smallholder dominance and 
impoverishment
The global predominance of smallholders, emphasised 
in MacWilliam (2018), has not simply continued but 
increased, particularly where governments have seen 
this form of production as central to other national 
objectives (see below). The widespread impoverishment 
which goes with smallholder dominance is now of 
international concern. The major chemical company 
Bayer warned (2018) of the serious effects of a reduction 
in coffee yields for the 25 million smallholders who 
produce 80 per cent of global output. The chemical giant 
repeated a warning made at the September 2016 meeting 
of the International Coffee Organization that low profits 
and incomes were already being experienced by growers. 
Central American countries are one epicentre of 
the crisis. Honduras, which produces and exports at 
least six times as much arabica coffee as PNG and ranks 
about fifth in global output compared to PNG’s 15th 
to 17th, has widespread poverty in the countryside. 
Out-migration and households straddling between 
smallholder coffee growing and wage work in the 
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prices of the mid-1970s following severe frosts in Brazil 
assisted to strengthen critics of any efforts to affect 
markets. The system of fixed quotas and price support 
levels faced greater criticism and political opposition, 
particularly in the United States. From 1976, when 
the 1968 ICA was renegotiated, provisions were 
introduced which permitted the suspension of quotas 
when prices rose above an indicator level, and their 
reintroduction when prices fell. Prescribing conditions 
for stock holding and trying to keep trade regulated 
between member countries through a system of quota 
stamps indicated how the entry of new producers and 
consumers was threatening the future of any regulatory 
agreement (ICO n.d.).
The growing use of what became known as ‘tourist 
coffee’ — transiting through ports in non-member 
countries and then on to member country markets — 
exposed further cracks in an agreement that sought 
to give preference to ICO members and limit trade in 
‘surplus’, or above quota, coffee. The existence of such 
surpluses expressed what was happening in world 
coffee production and consumption, as new substantial 
producers and consumers — particularly of lower-
grade coffees — began to affect international prices 
(see above). Through the 1980s a series of on-again 
off-again suspensions and implementations of the 1983 
agreement showed up the underlying weaknesses in an 
ICA which sought to underpin prices for producers, 
most of whom were smallholders. 
By 1994, a conclusion was reached among ICO 
members that a new ICA could only be negotiated 
satisfactorily if it did not attempt to regulate prices. 
Under the 1994 and subsequent ICAs, the ICO became 
little more than a forum for discussing the condition 
of the world coffee economy, providing transparency 
on movements in production and consumption, and 
supplying some concessional financing for projects 
relating to and including:
quality improvement, pest control and 
improvement of marketing structures. Studies 
were carried out in areas such as coffee price 
determination and volatility, organic coffee, and 
the formation of a global research network on 
coffee (ICO n.d.). 
A promotion fund was utilised to encourage 
increased consumption, particularly in ‘new’ markets, 
to sponsor concerts and festivals as well as for 
briefing journalists. In effect, the ICO abrogated 
United States are a prominent feature of ‘broken village’ 
(Reichman 2011) existence in that country. Guatemala, 
another important Central American arabica producer, 
is similarly affected with the country being the ‘single 
largest source of migrants being apprehended at the US 
border … The migration problem is a coffee problem’ 
(Sieff 11/6/2019). 
Low prices and the conditions of smallholders have 
been at the centre of so-far minor efforts by major 
producing countries to raise prices. Meeting in advance 
of a World Coffee Producers Forum held in July 2019 
to discuss the ongoing price crisis, representatives of 
Brazil and Colombia, first and third respectively in 
global production totals, emphasised the long-term 
consequences for not only producing countries but also 
consumers. Farmers in these countries are ‘abandoning 
coffee farms, switching to illicit crops such as coca, 
leaving the countryside for larger cities or other 
countries altogether’ (Brown 24/6/2019). No substantial 
measures have been implemented to deal with the 
international crisis.
The decline of international efforts to deal with 
surpluses
At PNG’s independence in 1975, the international coffee 
market was supervised and coordinated under the 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA), first negotiated 
in 1962 (ICO n.d.). Under this agreement, and a 
subsequent 1968 follow-up, there were established:
provisions for the application of a quota 
system whereby supplies of coffee in excess of 
consumer requirements were withheld from 
the market. Under other provisions, production 
and diversification policies were initiated to 
limit supplies of coffee and promotion activities 
instituted to increase consumption (ICO n.d.).
These efforts generally worked to advantage 
producers (Bates 1997:16–19). Subsequently, there 
were criticisms that the ICO was a cartel formed by 
the major producer and consumer countries (Bates 
1997; cf. MacWilliam forthcoming), and, as such, 
an oligopolistic barrier to the operation of ‘the free 
market’. However, during the 1960s and early 1970s, 
the ICA was lauded as bringing stability to the coffee 
market, and also assisting governments, including in 
PNG, to extend commercialisation by (re)attaching 
unemployed or under-utilised labour to smallholdings 
(MacWilliam 2018, 2019; cf. Stewart 1992). The high 
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responsibility for the long-term declining real prices 
that were affecting the living standards of smallholders 
worldwide.7 When combined with a similar direction 
becoming dominant at the national level in many 
countries, including PNG, coffee producers ceased to 
receive previously important forms of support. This 
will now be shown for the case of PNG.
Part 2: PNG coffee production since 
independence
Individual grower responsibility and minor official 
reforms in PNG
Over the last 40 years, more and more of PNG’s total 
coffee production continues to go to those sections 
of the market where downward pressure on prices 
has been most substantial, as explained above. Even 
as there have been efforts to increase production 
directed at specialty consumption (Sengere, Curry and 
Koczberski 2019), there has also been ‘a decline in the 
average quality and price of Papua New Guinean coffee’ 
(Batt and Murray-Prior 2007). With only occasional 
peaks, international prices for PNG’s main coffee 
exports have remained stagnant, even in nominal 
terms, since independence (Sengere 2016:92, Figure 
4.3). Regardless of this price trend, as the smallholding 
proportion of total output has increased, from around 
70 to 85 per cent, there has been a continuous call to 
increase production and improve quality (see below).
The impact of income from the crop for the living 
standards of Highlands’ households in the four main 
coffee-growing provinces has only become greater over 
that period. However, while the crop’s importance has 
persisted for the region and the people who live in it, 
there has been a substantial change in its significance 
for national export revenues. Since the early 1970s, 
agricultural exports, including coffee, have become 
less important as contributors to export revenues (Elek 
1992; MacWilliam 1996:65; Batten 2013). The start of 
copper and gold production at Panguna mine has been 
followed by increased output of minerals, gas and oil, 
from a series of other mines. By 2017, coffee exports 
comprised less than two per cent of the national total, 
compared with petroleum gas (28 per cent), gold (24 
per cent), copper ore (8 per cent) and wood (6 per 
cent). Of the agricultural exports, palm oil at five per 
cent of the total is more important for national export 
revenues than coffee (OEC 2017). Concurrent with 
this reduced importance for national revenues, there 
has been a major decline in government efforts to raise 
productivity and improve living conditions for coffee-
producing smallholders. The decline has occurred in 
distinct phases, as will now be demonstrated.
The first post-independence changes:  
Further expansion, price stabilisation and state reform
In PNG, the end of the mid-1970s exceptional price 
boom drove an effort to reinvigorate and expand 
coffee growing. With finance provided by international 
institutions, including the World Bank, and conveyed 
through the local National Development Bank, a 
rapid expansion occurred. A prominent feature of the 
new plantings were the 20- and 5-hectare projects, 
subsequently dubbed ‘blocks’ and hence giving rise 
to the term ‘block coffee’, situated primarily in the 
Eastern and Western Highlands provinces (Hulme 
1983; MacWilliam 1986; Stewart 1992:176–203; 
Sinclair 1995:363–83). These blocks are now run 
as mini-plantations by commercial concerns rather 
than smallholders with management companies. 
Their establishment was in part an attempt to 
counter the decline in plantation production, which 
followed the drive to transfer largeholding ownership 
from expatriates to Indigenes under the Plantation 
Redistribution Scheme (Walter 1981). The projects 
aimed to consolidate landholdings in a form that 
resulted in improved productivity through an increased 
division of labour. Rather than the household labour 
processes involving relatively undifferentiated labour, 
the projects required a combination of (frequently 
expensive) management and labour, the latter often 
engaged on what were termed ‘sweat equity’ conditions. 
This form of labour consisted mainly of deferred 
payment for work done on the promise of profits to 
landholders/workers once an initial loan was partly 
or completely repaid. As both plantation production 
and quality of smallholder coffee declined, the intent 
was to fill the gap by a form of centralised production 
that replaced the former and consolidated myriad 
smallholdings into a form of production that would 
result in increased productivity and higher quality 
green bean. However, many of these projects failed, 
with perhaps the most notable success being where the 
project continued as a producer of organic coffee in the 
Eastern Highlands (Sinclair 1995; see below). 
Although prices declined sharply in the early 1980s, 
a brief peak in the mid-decade was followed by the 
dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 7 
DPA Discussion Paper 2020/1
easier for the levy to be raised and funds to accumulate 
and then be disbursed when prices fell. While the 
moves from levy to subsidy and reverse continued 
through the 1980s, they did so against an unfavourable 
trend in prices: households depended less upon price 
increases to lift incomes than upon greater volumes of 
coffee produced. 
The greater volumes came mainly not from 
increased productivity on existing holdings but by 
a major expansion of the area planted to bushes: 
plantings became more widespread without becoming 
large-scale in terms of the methods of production. 
Smallholders extended their plantings on to new 
areas without substantial changes to labour processes 
by maintaining household divisions of labour. As 
largeholdings declined in importance, the area planted 
to smallholder coffee increased from approximately 
40,000 hectares at the beginning of the 1980s to 
an estimated 65,000 to 70,000 hectares by 1989 
(Fleming and Antony 1993:24). Using production 
figures and average yields from the early 2000s, it 
was estimated that by 2006 the planted acreage had 
increased further. There were 70,000–85,000 hectares 
of smallholder coffee compared to 12,000–15,000 
hectares of plantation and block coffee (Allen, Bourke 
and McGregor 2009:309). This expansion accelerated 
the trend begun in the 1960s of the main smallholder 
production centre moving westwards, away from 
Eastern Highlands Province into Western Highlands 
Province (MacWilliam 1985) and what is now 
Jiwaka Province. However, along with the increased 
production, an initial estimation of a long-term 
improvement in prices was proving wildly optimistic. 
From the mid-1990s, the end of price support from 
stabilisation funds would make household existence 
even more precarious (see below).
Competition and the race to the bottom in 
processing and marketing during the 1980s and 
early 1990s
Two specific circumstances which occurred in this 
decade also affected smallholder production. The 
first was the April 1986 discovery of coffee leaf rust 
in Western Highlands and the subsequent efforts 
to limit the effects of the disease. The second was 
dilution of the importance of the major exporting 
firms by granting more licences to new firms, some 
with limited experience and ability to scrutinise the 
beginning of a slump that lasted until 1993. At that 
point prices were in nominal (that is, not inflation-
adjusted) terms only slightly above where they had 
been before the mid-1970s price boom (OECD 2007:6, 
Figure 5). To an extent, the effects of the slump were 
mitigated for consumers using coffee incomes to 
purchase imported goods because of the official ‘hard 
kina’ strategy that maintained the PNG currency’s 
exchange rate vis-a-vis other currencies (Chand and 
Yala 2009; see below).8 Coincident with these price 
fluctuations a number of major changes occurred in the 
PNG coffee industry.
As important as the hard kina strategy was for 
households, so too were domestic attempts at price 
stabilisation. As the rate of unemployment increased 
rapidly for the country as a whole, successive 
governments became concerned to keep populations 
in the countryside. Maintaining the household 
compulsion to labour remained critical for government 
policies (MacWilliam 1996:41–48). Continued 
occupation of smallholdings, where households 
engaged in self-provisioning as well as produced 
for local and overseas markets, became even more 
critical for governments. That households had become 
major consumers of purchased goods underlined the 
importance of bolstering coffee prices. Supporting 
stabilisation funds for coffee, cocoa and copra in 
particular became a form of ‘working for the dole’ 
(MacWilliam 1996), paying growers to produce crops 
whose international prices could not meet household 
consumption needs. Government revenue raised from 
the export of mineral and other resources was used to 
bolster the stabilisation funds when they were not able 
to rely upon levies imposed on growers. 
In the case of coffee, a Coffee Industry Fund 
(CIF) had been established in 1968 as part of efforts 
to stabilise prices at a critical moment in the country’s 
transition to independence (MacWilliam 2018, 2019). 
The dramatic boost in prices which followed the 1975 
frost in Brazil created an opportunity for the Coffee 
Marketing Board (CMB, later CIB) to increase the 
fund’s importance for price stabilisation. The CIB lifted 
its existing levy on growers. The move to establish 
a comprehensive stabilisation fund was further 
encouraged by the possibility that PNG would be 
associated with the European Economic Community 
and have access to STABEX (Système de Stabilisation 
des Recettes d’Exportation) funds being established 
under the Lome Convention. The price rise made it 
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In the eight years prior to the establishment of the 
CIC (in October 1991), the proportion of coffee 
exports by the four major firms had been reduced 
from nearly 90% to under 70%. The number 
of licences allocated by the CIB to green bean 
exporters had increased from eight in 1982/83 to 
13 in 1990/91.
For the older, more established exporters who 
also owned processing factories, with long-established 
international connections and reputations to uphold, 
scrutinising the quality of coffee purchased from 
smallholders was critical. As Sinclair (1995:391) notes, 
citing Craig McConaghy, one-time executive officer 
of the Coffee Industry Association (CIA), and later 
employee of the long-established major exporter 
ANGCO regarding the de-regulation of export licences:
with lots and lots of new people coming in, 
exporting was thought to be a licence to print 
money. You got people who rented an office, a 
fax, a phone, a desk and went into exporting. 
They didn’t have the professionalism to carry on 
a professional exporting operation. Almost all of 
them eventually went broke.
For McConaghy and others involved in exporting, 
professionalism included maintaining the international 
reputation of PNG coffee, which affected prices 
obtained. For new firms, gaining a greater share of 
export volumes from older exporters was an important 
means of trying to mitigate the effects of declining 
international prices and their margins. Quality controls 
were often less important, partly because the new firms 
did not have processing facilities operating at the same 
standards as more established exporters. 
The competition between exporters reached one 
peak when a new firm trying to establish itself as a 
major exporter bypassed the established procedure 
for obtaining an export quota through the CIB 
(MacWilliam 1993; Sinclair 1995:406–9). In 1987, as 
the battle to contain leaf rust continued, Panga Coffee 
sought approval to export what amounted to 80 per 
cent of the total PNG crop. Unsurprisingly, the CIB 
refused this request: Panga subsequently applied direct 
to the ICO for permission to export 100 tonnes of 
PNG coffee to West Germany. Again, unsurprisingly, 
the ICO refused Panga’s request and also took punitive 
action against PNG coffee exporting as a whole. The 
ICO cancelled ongoing negotiations with the CIB over 
quality of the coffee purchased by their agents for 
processing and export. Both the outbreak and the 
fight against leaf rust, as well as the granting of more 
export licences, have been previously extensively 
covered and details do not need to be repeated here 
(Shaw et al. 1986; Coffee Industry Association 1986; 
MacWilliam 1990, 1993; Stewart 1992; Sinclair 1995). 
While the national government’s resources committed 
to combat the rust outbreak were substantial, including 
for the reformation of the research and extension roles 
within the Coffee Industry Board/ Coffee Industry 
Corporation (CIB/CIC), the longer-term consequences 
for state supervision of smallholder coffee were less 
significant. Occurring as it did during the period when 
smallholders were expanding plantings, as noted above, 
the concentrated focus upon leaf rust and survival of 
the coffee industry probably only had a marginal effect 
on the overall decline in quality.
The decline was more influenced by the second 
factor, the battle over licences granted to export coffee, 
which also took place in this period. Smallholder coffee 
was and still is sold by growers as either unprocessed 
cherry or first phase processed parchment, washed and 
dried to varying standards. Parchment coffee comprises 
about 95 per cent of smallholder sales (Inu 2015:39). 
This coffee is sold to roadside buyers, usually engaged 
by exporting firms, some of which also operate the 
most substantial processing factories, or by smallholders 
directly to factories. There is a continuous tussle 
between growers and buyers over prices paid, in which a 
range of means are employed to increase or decrease the 
amounts received by the former. Scales used by buyers 
which falsify weights and smallholders adding water to 
bagged beans are just two of the ‘tricks’ used. 
Prices fell again after the mid-1980s spike, disorder 
increased with more coffee stolen and armed holdups 
proliferating. Plantation firms were forced to increase 
expenditure on security measures (MacWilliam 1993; 
Sinclair 1995). Firms have been forced to continue their 
attempts to reduce theft into the next century (Imbun 
2014:31) and the CIC has become involved in efforts to 
increase policing (see below). The tussle over returns 
to growers intensified and was made even more central 
to exports as these localised conflicts were expressed 
in the competition between established exporters and 
other firms trying to break into the market, ending in 
damage to PNG’s reputation as a coffee exporter. As 
MacWilliam (1993:483, 484, Table 1) notes:
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In May 2019, an announcement was made that a 
new Australian-funded program called Grow PNG 
would soon be instituted to help move PNG’s coffee 
farmers up the value chain. Under the program: ‘In 
2019, 3000 coffee farmers will be trained in good 
agricultural practices’ (James 29/5/2019). The initial 
focus of the program is to develop coffee production 
in the Markham Valley in Morobe Province, a location 
distant from the main coffee growing areas and the 
bulk of the around 400,000 households dependent 
upon coffee prices for incomes (ibid.).
Labour and land
Contrary to claims that customary land tenure did not 
facilitate production increases (Lea and Curtin 2011), 
in the case of coffee the reverse occurred. As shown by 
MacWilliam (2018), and above, from the 1940s until 
the present, household output from smallholdings 
underwent a spectacular increase from no coffee grown 
to around 85 per cent of over one million bags in peak 
years. From the 1960s, when smallholder production 
first exceeded that from large holdings, plantations, 
mostly on leased land, have become less important 
in production volumes while retaining a significance 
in their output of higher-grade coffee. A major 
contributor to the decline in plantations and blocks has 
been shortages of labour, when adjoining households 
have worked their own holdings to produce coffee and 
other food crops for local marketing (see below). 
So successful has been the expansion of smallholder 
production that there are now probably major shortages 
of land suitable and available (location, altitude, soil 
types, rainfall as well as ownership tussles) for further 
increases in the area available for coffee growing. 
While assessing the availability of suitable land is 
always fraught with conjecture, several salient points 
need to be borne in mind. Firstly, as noted by Sinclair 
(1995) and MacWilliam (2018), many early plantings 
by European settlers were made on land not suited to 
arabica coffee growing. Vacant areas do not necessarily 
imply land of the necessary fertility, rainfall and so 
forth for a crop that is not drought, frost or hot sun 
tolerant. Arabica trees, unlike robusta, do not grow well 
at hotter, more humid, lower altitudes. Nor are arabica 
trees frost tolerant. (The growing of vegetables offers 
more flexibility, in particular at higher altitudes beyond 
those where coffee can be grown, or in drier areas 
suitable for some root crops but not arabica coffee.)9
increasing PNG’s export quota, which would have 
added a further 300 tonnes above the 1988 quota. A 
prolonged saga ensued. Panga subsequently collapsed 
with a major debt owed to the CIB/CIC (MacWilliam 
1993; Sinclair 1995). But reputational damage 
remained and the efforts to assert quality priorities for 
smallholder coffee took a prolonged hit. 
Part 3: Three decades of extended capture
Over the next three decades, concerns have been 
regularly expressed about the future of coffee 
production in PNG. Apart from urging continual 
increases in output, including by extending production 
into areas where little coffee growing previously 
occurred, most attention was paid to declining 
quality. However, given the number of households 
that grew coffee over a substantial area, the efforts by 
governments and other state agencies to reverse trends 
have been generally minor. They have been made even 
less significant by the continuing post-independence 
decline in agricultural extension services (cf. Imbun 
2014:29), which extended to many parts of the 
country beyond coffee-growing areas. Individualising 
responsibility by passing it on to household growers, 
with little if any price support, and quasi-privatising 
the principal agency, the CIC, acted against both 
regularised output and quality improvements. While 
the CIC, with support from the World Bank and PNG 
government, has recently played a role in the fight 
against an outbreak of the potentially devastating 
coffee berry borer, it also constructed a policing role to 
combat stealing of coffee and cash used by traders (CIC 
2018a). The CIC, as well as the national government 
and the World Bank have been active in trying to 
upgrade major highways and what have been recently 
termed ‘commodity roads’ (CIC 25/6/2019). There 
are also continuing attempts to form cooperatives and 
other organisations fostering grower collaboration 
(Imbun 2014:30–34). Coupling growers with processors 
to improve bean quality has been a favoured direction 
for a relatively small number of household producers 
(Sengere, Curry and Koczberski 2019). Efforts to 
raise the prices received by smallholders are largely 
confined to improving the demand for PNG coffee 
in what is termed ‘differentiated marketing’ or ‘niche 
markets’ while acknowledging that further increasing 
the volume of coffee produced in the lower Y-grades is 
unlikely to halt the longer-term decline (Inu 2015:40). 
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smallholder sellers. Licences to buy smallholder coffee 
were not granted to many expatriate estates, and the 
‘partnership’ ideology propagated by settler leaders was 
rebuffed by the colonial administration (cf. Sengere, 
Curry and Koczberski 2019). When a small number of 
private firms already dominated domestic buying, and 
production was increasingly dominated by smallholders, 
the CMB advertised prices paid to growers, checked 
quality standards, and issued export licences but did 
not market coffee internationally. Two firms dominated, 
ANGCO and Coffee International Limited, even as the 
number of firms which exported fluctuated between 8 
and 27 (MacWilliam 1993:4, Table 1). 
During the 1980s, two forces combined to demand 
changes in the issue of export licences. During the 
1970s’ price boom the number of exporters fell from 
27 in 1972–73 to 8: by 1988–89 there were still only 
10, with ANGCO exporting around one-third of 
the national total. While the share of exports by the 
four main companies had fallen from 89 per cent in 
1982–83 to 77 per cent in 1988–89, this continued 
concentration of exporters (when prices internationally 
were declining) attracted the by-then standard 
objections to market power acting against the prices 
paid to smallholding producers. 
The second force was the increasing importance 
of nationalism with regard to ownership and control 
of export licences. Even as ANGCO’s share of exports 
fell from 48 per cent at independence to 30 per cent in 
1990–91, that the company was now completely owned 
by the PNG Investment Corporation and subsequently 
a private local firm, Pagini Transport, did not quell 
the nationalist complaints. This was in part because 
expatriates continued to manage ANGCO under an 
agreement with a Sydney-based firm, Comang (Sinclair 
1995:435–39). One solution to the two complaints 
was to issue more export licences to more firms, 
preferably locally owned, regardless of the expertise or 
international connections of the exporters (see above).
The major exporters and plantation operators 
conducted a prolonged campaign against the CMB 
and the manner in which offices on the organisation’s 
governing body were filled, resulting in the so-called 
politicisation of the board (MacWilliam 1993; 
Sinclair 1995). The result was a quasi-privatisation 
in the form of the CIC, an incorporated body with 
grower and other commercial representation on the 
board, elected by various organisations. However, 
the CIC remains dependent upon government 
Secondly, land shortages limit the possibility for 
increasing the area under smallholder plantings and 
continue to be associated with fighting, including 
in areas close to the best transport routes and thus 
markets. Intergenerational tensions also affect the 
availability of land for increasing acreages planted 
to coffee. By the 1970s, it was already apparent that 
the first generation of household coffee planters 
were confining the prospects of future generations. 
Subsequently, not only did the land shortages lead 
to increasing sales of land, but also subdivision of 
land within families, so that occupation intensified 
individualisation of land usage (Inu 2015:83–84). The 
concentrations of affines on smallholdings might have 
been expected to result in more productive use of 
land and availability of labour at critical times. Instead 
declining soil fertility and disputes over the optimum 
use of land, including whether to plant permanent or 
short-term crops, have probably led to major reductions 
in productivity (yield per hectare) on coffee-growing 
smallholdings.10 When combined with price fluctuations 
on a static or even declining long-term trend, and 
the increasing importance of currency for calculating 
labour provided even by affines (Inu 2015:94–99), 
the commitment of households to coffee production 
volumes and quality has fluctuated considerably.11
The state, privatisation, deregulation and the CIC
As noted above, with an end of international efforts 
to regulate international prices through an ICA in 
the 1990s, the role of some national governments, 
including Brazil and Vietnam, has become of 
importance in boosting international coffee production 
and export. PNG is not one such nation-state: instead 
some changes, as in the near-collapse of agricultural 
extension services, have tended to place more 
and more importance on the labour expended by 
individual smallholders. Other changes, as in the quasi-
privatisation of the main regulatory state agency the 
CIC, have had a perverse effect. 
When constructed in the early 1960s, the CMB 
was primarily intended to regulate the domestic 
marketing of coffee and represent Australia–PNG in 
international forums to secure preferable shares of 
the global market. One of its early moves regarding 
the former was to weaken the connections between 
household producers and settler plantation buyers and 
processors, in the interests of obtaining higher prices for 
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now priced well below the cost of production. Instead 
of concentrating on lifting production volumes of 
commodity coffee, the specialist urged PNG producers 
to aim at the higher-priced differentiated sector and 
specialty coffees (see also Inu 2015:40). In order to 
deal with lower prices, producers should emphasise 
production of specialty coffees through ‘relentless 
devotion to best practices’ (James 29/5/2019). This 
segment of the market is the fastest growing, although 
still a minor proportion of the total volume of coffee 
traded internationally, and in which there are supply 
shortages instead of the surpluses prevailing for 
commodity coffee.
The specialist was effectively advising PNG to 
follow a trend already under way internationally for 
what is also a very small proportion of local production 
(see below). As the CIC (22/3/2017) noted:
Despite the general decline in production, the 
exports of verified and certified coffees (4C, 
TK, UTZ and RFA certified), Organic, Fairtrade 
and Fairtrade Organic coffees grew steadily 
by 22% on average in the last 5 years. Exports 
of certified coffees constitutes 5% of the annual 
exports. Exports of Organic, Fairtrade Organic 
and Fairtrade coffees in 2016 totalled 3,482 
tonnes, an increase of 24% compared to previous 
year. In 2016, exports of 4C, UTZ, RFA and TK 
compliant coffees grew significantly by 61%, or 
more than half the previous period. The growth 
in exports of certified coffee attributed to the 
increase in number of licensed or certified coffee 
farmers, consequently earning increased returns 
to farmers who are participating in certification 
programs. (emphasis added)
The extent to which measures for improving 
quality focus upon concentrated production, increased 
coordination and scrutiny, as well as longer working 
hours for a relatively small number of coffee growers, 
can be seen in two instances. The first, promoted at 
the same Port Moresby conference, described the new 
Australian aid program titled Grow PNG noted above, 
with the intention of helping to move ‘PNG’s coffee 
farmers up the value chain’ (James 29/5/2019). How 
or why a relatively small number of smallholders in 
this part of the country would behave differently to the 
much larger number of households already growing 
coffee in the central Highlands was something the 
program announcement did not specify.
funding and approval of processes by which board 
membership is filled. Various activities, including 
the construction of a police arm and rebuilding 
feeder roads at the behest of government authorities, 
validate the description of the CIC as a case of quasi-
privatisation (CIC 2018a, 2018b).12
On the surface, the formation of the CIC seems 
to have met both the objections against dominance 
by a few firms and the need to issue more licences to 
indigenous firms. In 2016, there were 22 exporters, 
which had increased to 25 in the CIC directory of 
licensed exporters (CIC 2019), with two of the top 
six firms being ‘national’ (CIC 22/3/2017). However, 
closer inspection shows that the general characteristic 
of trading capital, to centralise and concentrate even 
faster than productive capital (Kay 1975), still reigns. 
With a privatised CIC, ‘market power’ remains as 
a force acting against smallholders in quantity and 
quality considerations.
In 2016, the top six firms handled nearly four-
fifths of the total exported, with the other 16 firms 
handling the remainder. Three firms connected to 
international coffee traders exported more than half of 
the total. Of at least equal significance for the process 
of concentration is how this has occurred in market 
segmentation. In terms of exporter market share by 
grade, one firm remained dominant in A/AA-grades 
(34 per cent), another shipped the most X/AX-grades 
(39 per cent) while a third exported the most Y1-grade 
(31 per cent) and Y3-grade (34 per cent) coffee. A 
fourth firm exported the most PSC-grade (36 per cent). 
A fifth firm only exported robusta coffee in 2015 and 
had done so for five previous years (CIC 22/3/2017). 
What this concentration down to a few exporting 
firms — both in terms of total market shares and for 
particular grades — has done for the price competition 
(so critical for the reformers of the overarching coffee 
agency) remains unexamined, at least publicly.
Tussling with trends — specialisation and collaboration
In May 2019, at a coffee conference held in Port 
Moresby, a specialist in the international coffee 
trade gave some advice to the PNG industry (James 
29/5/2019). He began by acknowledging that the price 
of ‘commodity coffee’, meaning the bulk of the world’s 
produce, is at its lowest level since 2005. At 90 cents 
US per pound (or 0.45 kilograms)13 this coffee, which 
comprises about 80 per cent of the world market, is 
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replace the earlier largeholding form which has become 
of minor importance. Smallholders are consolidated 
in terms of land and labour: ANGCO’s Purosa organic 
operations began by consolidating seven leases totalling 
907 hectares (Sinclair 1995:444). Smallholders from 
the area whose land had been consolidated were 
employed as wage labourers to clear land, plant coffee, 
build wet and dry factories, and construct a trade store 
(Sinclair 1995:444–45). ANGCO supplied a tractor, 
and a helicopter was used to bring in cash to pay wages 
and for coffee sold. In short, organic farming involved 
directly industrialising production and supplanting 
smallholder agriculture, however much local 
householders were shareholders in the venture. That 
Purosa–Okapa production was insufficient to meet 
international demand, and Coffee Connections had to 
extend its operations to other areas in search of organic 
coffee, repeated the process by which processors and 
traders had operated in the 1960s and 1970s phase of 
coffee’s expansion. 
Labels such as ‘organic’ and ‘Fair Trade’ coffee 
provided a cover for another, newer, form by which 
households were subject to capital. The question 
remains: could other proposals that have emerged over 
the last 20 years for changing the terms of household 
existence — and to mitigate the effects of reliance 
upon coffee production for incomes — provide better 
routes out of the malaise? One such route with a long 
pedigree and recent re-emphasis is for households to 
diversify production. The route involves transforming 
previous production for immediate consumption, self-
provisioning or so-called subsistence production, into 
forms of commercialised production. As with coffee, 
this change also maintains household attachment 
to land under conditions where living standards are 
subject to the vagaries of market prices (see below).
The consequences of diversification
One welcomed direction of change has been some 
diversification of crops grown, either for export 
(for example, cardamom) or for local consumption. 
Such measures would supposedly give smallholders 
alternative sources of income, which would lift living 
standards and ameliorate the price effects of coffee, 
either in its rapid fluctuations or longer-term trends. 
Because women tend to dominate both production and 
selling of foods into local markets, diversification also 
benefits hitherto disadvantaged female members of 
A better idea of what is required to produce higher 
quality organic coffee can be ascertained from the case 
of the conversion of an originally ANGCO-operated 
block project in the Kainantu district of the Eastern 
Highlands, or more precisely the Purosa area of the 
Okapa sub-district (Sinclair 1995:444–46). In the early 
1990s, several moves were made by different firms 
to obtain organic certification for block production, 
notably in new areas. Having extended its activities 
into largeholding production in order to counter the 
decline in the availability of plantation grades, ANGCO 
first moved into an area near the newly constructed 
Yonki dam and then subsequently into Purosa. Since 
no fertilisers or pesticides had been employed in the 
latter area, it was an obvious location to obtain and 
commence organic production. Local smallholders were 
joined in a collaborative arrangement, with ANGCO the 
majority shareholder, in a venture which planted coffee 
on several substantial areas of leasehold land. 
In order to secure production standards and 
amounts, ANGCO also provided management and 
processing, as well as facilitated transportation from 
an area which is isolated and only accessible by 
substandard roads or by air. That is, unlike for the 
bulk of smallholder production and initial processing 
utilising family labour processes to produce parchment 
coffee, an industrial labour process combined with 
machinery, including aeroplanes that avoided potholed 
roads and thieves, was used by ANGCO to surmount 
the deficiencies of much household production in 
the rest of the Highlands. When ANGCO ceased 
operations in the early 2000s, Coffee Connections 
took over management of the Purosa–Okapa venture 
and extended its reach into smallholder production 
elsewhere in the Eastern Highlands, including 
proximate to Goroka. Coffee Connections further 
strengthened its international accreditation through 
the Fair Trade organisation. Coffee Connections also 
benefited by operating in conjunction with US firm 
Vournas Coffee, which advertises itself as the largest 
importer of organic Fairtrade PNG coffee into the US 
(Vournas Coffee 6/6/2017). In 2017, organic exports 
constituted less than one per cent of the PNG total 
(Coffee Connections 2017). 
Instead of the emphasis upon individual 
responsibility to improve yields and quality being urged 
for the majority of growers by the CIC, in this instance, 
there is an attempt to re-impose industrial methods of 
production on a relatively small number of growers to 
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in what has been termed ‘the morality of markets’ 
(Oceania 2019). 
As with coffee, international and national 
conditions continue to affect Highland household 
production of these crops, including through what is 
termed responsiveness to ‘price or market messages’. A 
case in point is the effect on sweet potato production 
of the mid-1990s devaluation of the national currency. 
The change occurred as a result of the abandonment 
of the hard kina strategy which had been employed 
after independence. Once abandoned, making the 
kina more directly subject to international currency 
markets, the price of the falling PNG currency was 
rapidly transmitted into household production and 
consumption. When there were substantial increases 
in prices for imported consumer goods, including 
rice, an increase in demand for domestically produced 
sweet potato encouraged greater production and 
consumption of the food crop. Sweet potato has long 
been a major staple central to self-provisioning as well 
as local markets in much of the country. As Michael 
Bourke and Bryant Allen also note (2009:7), the 2008 
global financial crisis which brought ‘rapid increases 
in the price of rice and other imported foods’, led 
to a greater consumption of sweet potato. This and 
other forms of diversification that appeared to lessen 
the dependence upon coffee, nevertheless, made 
households (producing for immediate consumption, 
self-provisioning as well as for sale in local 
markets) more subject to the price of the kina, as an 
internationally traded currency and thus a measure of 
relative global prices. 
While smallholders have increasingly become 
marketers of their own produce (Busse and Sharp 
2019:126) or that of affines, their living conditions are 
also subject to the vagaries of local markets whether or 
not the sellers are men, or now predominantly women. 
Attempts by producer-sellers to impose uniformity in 
prices (Busse 2019) may work to impose a particular 
solidarity but at the end of the day, quite literally, 
over-production leads to lowering of prices, giving 
away of unsold produce or sellers taking perishable 
supplies back to homes for domestic use. Rather than 
attend major established markets in urban and other 
population centres, where competition is more intense 
and costs of selling higher, other growers sell by the 
roadside close to homes. 
George Curry, Gina Koczberski and Susan Inu, in 
providing a description of smallholder diversification 
households. Gender equality and female empowerment 
is therefore advanced.
While there has been an important increase in 
incomes for some households and probably also 
women’s incomes out of just such diversification, 
this direction is itself subject to trends obvious in 
coffee. The bulk of households are no less trapped on 
smallholdings if they produce coffee and/or locally 
marketed vegetables, fruit and any other goods. 
While the stagnation in prices has in part been 
met by increasing acreages under the crop to produce 
greater volumes of mainly parchment coffee (see 
above), another major change has been occurring in 
the Highlands. As pointed out recently by MacWilliam 
(2018), an important dimension of late colonial 
development plans was to stimulate increased self-
provisioning by smallholders, as well as production for 
local and international markets (MacWilliam 2013). 
Since independence, there has not only been the 
increase in coffee produced for exports as described 
above, but also a major growth of various forms of 
local markets where mainly household-grown crops 
of vegetables and fruit are sold. Some of the produce 
is for local consumption. Other goods are transported 
to distant markets within PNG over land and sea 
(Benediktsson 1998, 2002). Some foods, including 
betel nut and mangoes grown at lower altitudes, are 
conveyed into Highland markets (Sharp 2012, 2019). 
The range of forms growth has taken are an effect 
of the continuing attachment of smallholders to land, 
with household labour processes critical for producing 
coffee, other crops and livestock. That is, as much as 
the increases have involved extension of the land area 
under use and employment of a growing population, 
most of the change in producing food crops has 
occurred without industrialisation of agriculture. 
Capitalisation has proceeded primarily through the 
production and consumption of commercialised 
commodities without the separation of households 
from land. (There are of course instances of industrial 
food production, including sugar, poultry and beef, 
but these are not predominant.) While growing of 
pineapples, broccoli, oranges and other produce has 
become widespread where soil and other conditions 
are favourable, it has not become large scale. One 
consequence of the dominance of the smallholder form 
of production is that it has led to the prevalence of 
particular marketing forms, where grower-sellers are 
in the majority and often able to claim their primacy 
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what has become a more general condition in rural 
PNG. Instead of facilitating a process which would 
remove the potential for ‘enclaves of rural entrapment’, 
coffee-producing households have been tied to 
smallholdings in conditions that provide only limited 
potential for improvements in living standards. Even 
when and where these exist, whether in dietary changes 
that improve health or purchase of industrial goods, 
it is international price fluctuations that are the major 
determinant of what can occur. Laying responsibility 
for outcomes upon individual households, as in the 
marketing slogan adopted by the CIC cited above, 
deflects serious consideration of the determinants of 
household existence.
The essay commenced with reference to a recent 
statement by PNG’s Prime Minister Marape, who drew 
attention to how the bulk of the country’s population 
is located in ‘enclaves of rural entrapment’ and the 
need for state action to change conditions. Missing in 
this analysis is how such a change might occur or the 
policy implications for the PNG government. Nor has 
there been a focus upon how the conditions arose. By 
using the case of coffee-producing households in the 
central Highlands over the period since independence, 
the argument is developed here that at least for these 
smallholders, entrapment is a function of the terms of 
their commercialisation. 
These terms include a continuing attachment to 
smallholdings with limited state action to improve 
productivity and quality of produce. Changes in the 
international production and consumption of coffee 
have resulted in the bulk of PNG’s smallholder coffee 
being sold into the cheaper end of the consumer 
market, where competition is especially intense. This 
intensity is a result of major efforts by governments 
and other state agencies, including in Brazil, Vietnam 
and Indonesia, to increase production of arabica 
and particularly robusta for instant and other bulk 
coffee markets. With little consumption in the 
country, smallholder coffee producers in PNG remain 
part of the global ‘food bowl’ so important for the 
industrialisation and urbanisation that is occurring in 
other parts of the world. 
While urbanisation and industrialisation may bring 
higher living standards, such population movements 
result in another form of entrapment — as factory 
workers or urban unemployed. However, the point of 
this paper is not to promote an ‘urban alternative’ but 
to show the need for a deeper examination of rural 
also show its limits as a strategy to lift household 
living standards more generally. Employing research 
conducted in both cocoa and coffee growing areas, they 
argue that:
the recent emergence of large-scale profit-driven 
fresh food production in the highlands, which 
is providing new opportunities for women 
(and men) to earn potentially high incomes, is 
beginning to experience the same pressures of 
labour shortages and labour commodification 
that has characterised export crops. We argue that 
the moral frameworks governing food production 
are coming to resemble those governing export 
crops and hence are becoming more market-
based with a consequent contraction in the extent 
of the social and kinship networks from which 
labour can be drawn. Thus, labour for large-
scale commercially focused food gardening is 
becoming excised from networks of reciprocal 
exchange and is now increasingly dependent on 
household and hired labour (2019:247).
That is, even in the instances where smallholder 
income for a limited number of households is 
increased by concentrating upon production for a 
local market, including in Goroka, one of the largest 
urban centres in the Highlands, there is no route 
out. Households that initially focused upon coffee 
growing to provide incomes are subject to the same 
forces. Given the continuing attachment of households 
to land, the availability of labour remains a major 
barrier to industrial, large-scale production of food 
crops, as it has been since the introduction of coffee 
to the Highlands (Sinclair 1995; Collett 1992; Inu 
2015:95; MacWilliam 2018). Without that form of 
industrialisation, hiring more labour and attaching it to 
other means of production, even these entrepreneurial 
households are still smallholders, albeit with higher 
incomes. Diversification may stimulate differentiation 
among households and provide an escape route for 
the few, some of whom become capitalists engaging in 
multiplex enterprises (growing coffee and vegetables, 
trading, transportation) (Finney 1973). However, it is 
not an alternative road beyond coffee production out of 
rural entrapment for the many. 
Conclusion
The Discussion Paper concludes that coffee production 
by smallholders provides an illustrative instance of 
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4. All production figures for coffee output need to be treated 
cautiously, including because some are based upon 
calendar years, while others are based upon national 
financial years. Production also varies from year to year 
in all countries due to climatic and other factors. To 
illustrate yield variability, compare total global output in 
1975 with the immediately following years after a series of 
very heavy frosts in Brazil’s main coffee-growing regions, 
when production plummeted from over 60 million bags 
of Arabica to about 20 million bags less. Nevertheless, 
allowing for the wide range of factors, as will be discussed 
further below, PNG’s increased production has lagged 
behind the global output trend. PNG’s output has also 
fluctuated considerably, with one million bags being first 
reached in the late 1990s.
5. The measure ton is largely now only used in and by the 
US, or by American English writers. A tonne, the metric 
measure of most use internationally, is equivalent to 
1.102 tons. Internationally, national output is most often 
measured in terms of the total number of 60-kilogram 
bags, converted to tonnes by the division of 60 kg bags 
into the metric measure tonne, or 1000 kg. Thus 16.66 
bags each of 60 kg are equal to one tonne.
6. ‘Unwashed’ is used to describe the beans; this term 
derives from the beans being dried naturally, on the tree 
or once picked, without water being used to separate the 
outer flesh from the cherry. The result is a bean which is 
stronger flavoured than that resulting from the washed 
process used for Colombian and ‘other mild’ arabica 
producers, including PNG. 
7. Recently, the ICO tried to re-establish its importance 
for world production during the international crisis by 
producing an inaugural Coffee Development Report. The 
report, titled Growing for Prosperity, promotes ‘economic 
viability as the catalyst for a sustainable coffee sector’ 
and ‘presents an in-depth analysis of the root causes and 
impact of low coffee price levels and volatility. It contains 
an independent assessment of 50 possible actions to 
address the economic challenges and foster the long-
term sustainability of the coffee sector’ (Global Coffee 
Report 9/10/2019). 
8. It is often argued that reducing the relative price of the 
kina vis-a-vis other currencies aids farmers’ real incomes 
when they produce an export crop priced in US dollars. 
As a result, they can obtain increased incomes for 
purchasing goods from exports priced in US dollars, while 
also producing their own food through forms of self-
provisioning on smallholdings. However, as the forms of 
household consumption change to include more imported 
electronic goods (mobile phones, computers, television 
sets and so forth) the effect of eliminating the hard kina 
conditions in a region which has been central to post-
independence changes. Any action by governments 
and other state agencies to alleviate rural conditions 
throughout PNG could benefit from closer study of 
what has occurred through the increased production by 
smallholders of a major export crop. 
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Endnotes
1. Compare for instance the much-vaunted measures for 
reducing rural poverty in China as seen by an official 
government propaganda arm (The Telegraph 28/6/2018) 
and a biographical account of the process in Chang (2009). 
2. Central Highlands refers here to the main coffee growing 
provinces of the Eastern and Western Highlands, 
Simbu and, more recently, Jiwaka. While arabica is also 
grown in the Southern Highlands, Morobe and Madang 
provinces, the central Highlands provinces listed here are 
the areas where over 90 per cent of the country’s arabica 
exports originate.
3. Two and a half decades ago, Overfield (1994:2) suggested 
an even more substantial proportion of the population 
was involved in coffee growing. He stated: ‘Over 90 per 
cent of households in the principal coffee growing areas 
of the Highlands cultivate … [coffee]. These households 
contain approximately 35 per cent of the national 
population’. Whether there has been a drift away from 
coffee growing by households, as the comparison between 
1994 and 2017–19 assessments might suggest, cannot be 
evaluated on presently available data. 
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Chang, L. 2009. Factory Girls From Village to City in a 
Changing China. New York: Penguin Random House.
Coffee Connections 2017. Coffee Production.
CIA (Coffee Industry Association Ltd) 1986. Kopi Tok. Can 
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strategy is less predictable than this claim suggests. That 
is, there are terms of trade considerations to be assessed 
as well. In any case for this essay, the more important 
point is that both the hard kina strategy and ‘floating’ 
or even devaluing the currency result in households 
being ‘trapped’ on smallholdings as their existence is 
increasingly commercialised.
9. MacWilliam (2018) noted the 1950s advice of consultant 
coffee expert Yasuo Baron Goto that much of the land 
leased by expatriates in the Kainantu area was unsuitable 
for coffee growing. Indigenes had retained control over 
the better coffee land, making available for leases only 
contested and otherwise unsuitable spaces.
10. There are no substantial studies of overall smallholder 
productivity for the main coffee growing area and 
certainly none demonstrating linear trends. Instead, 
there are estimates based upon small samples (Collett 
1992), or aggregates reached by dividing total smallholder 
output by estimated area of land under coffee (Allen, 
Bourke and McGregor 2009:309). ‘Probably’ is probably 
the best conclusion that can be reached, based upon 
the views of knowledgeable informants, and does not 
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11. Imbun (2014:28–29) notes the attitudes of a group of 
Engan coffee growers to the labour demands of coffee, 
even when acknowledging the significance of income 
from sales. ‘[M]aintaining the plots and production 
on a consistent basis was not favoured as reflected in 
one villager’s remarks: “Why do we waste our time on 
a crop which pops up a good price in a blue moon? 
Looking after pigs is more profitable than cherry trees” 
(Author interview, 2010)’. While Enga is outside the more 
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nevertheless substantial fluctuations in total smallholder 
output suggest this attitude may not be confined to a small 
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